non-contractual third parties in Canada (Smieliauskas and Bewley, 2012, p. 79) . In Hercules, the plaintiffs were shareholders of Northguard Acceptance Ltd, which, together with Northguard Holdings Ltd. ("Northguard"), carried on business lending and investing money on the security of real property mortgages. The appellant, Hercules Managements Ltd., was among the shareholders who invested in Northguard. The respondent, Ernst & Young ("EY"), was initially hired by Northguard in 1971 to perform the Company's annual audits and provide audited reports to the Company's shareholders. In the early 1980s, things began to go downhill for Northguard and, in 1984, it went into receivership. The appellants and other investors in Northguard brought an action against EY in 1988 alleging that the audited financial reports from 1980 to 1981 were negligently prepared and, in reliance on these unqualified audit reports to make investment decisions, they suffered financial losses in their equity investment in excess of $850,000.
At issue in court was whether auditors (EY) owe shareholders a duty of care for negligently prepared audit reports. In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court's justices held that auditors owed a prima facie duty of care to current shareholders. The Court took the view that there might be a duty of care between auditors and shareholders, but this duty was negated because the purpose for which shareholders used audited financial reports is not the purpose for which those reports were intended. The Court concluded that audited reports are prepared for current shareholders to evaluate management performance, not to guide investment decisions (Brooks and Dunn, 2009, p. 459). The Court's ruling, which remains controversial to this day, held that, if there is a duty of care owed to shareholders, it is negated by the fact that it will open the floodgates and expose auditing firms to "indeterminate liability" from a broad class of plaintiffs, for an indeterminate length of time (see Smieliauskas and Bewley, 2012, p. 80 ).
Immediately following the Hercules' verdict, there was a series of high profile accounting fraud cases involving some of Canada's largest corporations (Lokanan, 2014) . The auditors of Nortel Networks, Eron Mortgage Corporation and Livent, among others, were all implicated in fraudulent misrepresentation (Rosen and Rosen, 2010, pp. 203-204) . In these cases, the companies all received unqualified audit reports, which later proved to be highly deficient and lacked some of the most basic audit procedures (Rosen and Rosen, 2010) . In more recent times, the issue of auditors' duty of care to independent third parties once again reared its ugly head in the Sino-Forest Corporation's ("Sino-Forest") (2012) scandal. As in previous cases, a similar pattern was repeated in Sino-Forest; the external auditors gave the Company a clean bill of health despite clear signs that it was falsifying its revenue (Kirby, 2014).
Soon after the Sino-Forest scandal was exposed, the audit profession in Canada again came under increased scrutiny from commentators and regulators alike for being reckless in failing to spot red flags of fraud and wilfully neglecting their duties as gatekeeper of corporate financial reports (Anand, 2004 (Williams, 2008, p. 491) . The rendering of financial statements as distorted is further circumscribed by the view that accounting standards and directors' profit projections are virtually immiscible and that regulation must meet a very high standard of proof by focusing on avoiding collateral damage to the profession rather than effecting positive change (Lokanan, 2015; Williams, 2008, p. 491; Sikka, 2015) . To reproduce a more general faith in the regulatability and governability of the audit profession, legal codes were mobilised by attorneys representing the interests of investors as the appropriate mode of action to hold auditors accountable to law and ethical standards. These codes were deployed to assess and respond to calls for fair treatment to investors and, more generally, third parties who relied on audited financial reports to make informed decisions parties who used the audited financial statements to inform their decisions were obliged to plead facts, which gave rise to an inference that fraud had been committed (Anand, 2004 The typical starting point of this argument is that auditors' liability to third parties is unnecessary because shareholders and creditors can purchase assurance from the companies by conducting their due diligence if they so wish to protect themselves (Goldberg, 1988, p. 295) . Implicit in this argument is that investors should conduct their due diligence before investing or risk investing in risky products because less diligence is needed (Lokanan, 2014; Tarr and Mack, 2013) . This narrow conception of stewardship returns stricter conditions under which a duty of care is owed by auditors to third parties (Peecher et al., 2013; Power, 1998 ; SamsonovaTaddei and Humphrey, 2015). The auditors' job is to conduct their audit to alleviate the information asymmetry between investors and firms.
Canadian Precedents
There has been considerable litigation in recent years concerning auditors' liability in Canada. To fully appreciate the Hercules decision, a brief review of the cases regarding auditors' liability in tort is necessary. Most claims against auditors in Canada come under the tort of negligence. To succeed in a claim of auditors' negligence, the plaintiff (i.e., noncontractual third parties) must show that they were owed a duty of care, there was a breach of the duty of care (e.g., failure to follow GAAS and/or GAAP), and there was factual causation, which resulted in damages to the plaintiffs (Smieliauskas and Bewley, 2012, pp. 77-80). For years, the landmark case in Canada regarding auditors' liability was Haig v. Bamford [1976] . In Haig, the Court ruled that there were three tests that needed to be established to determine an auditors' duty of care to third parties: foreseeability of the use of the financial statements by the third parties; actual knowledge of the limited class that will use and rely on the financial statements; and actual knowledge of the specific plaintiff who will use and rely on the financial statements (Chung et al., 2010, p. 69; see also Khoury, 2001 This is not a tenable argument and coalesces around a discursive trend of dominance and control manifested by the auditors when preparing financial statements (Sikka, 2009; Power, 2013) . Historically, a wide range of noncontractual third parties, ranging from individual investors to creditors, have relied on audited financial reports to make informed decisions as to whether to buy, sell, or hold stocks or finance the company through loans. Of these, investors can be classified as the most vulnerable (see Clikeman, 2013; Livesey, 2012; Sikka, 2015) . Hercules has increased this vulnerability by advocating a discourse which asserts "that investors who trade in securities of public corporations on a stock exchange or other secondary market have no remedy if they suffer loss as a result of negligent misrepresentation" (Anisman, 1997, p. 13). From a prospective shareholders' perspective, Hercules has effectively rendered the audit function meaningless by privileging the interest of corporations over the interests of investors (Anand, 2004, p. 17) . The ruling in Hercules acts as a catalyst to show how the problem of auditors' liability has been subverted to the point where audited financial statements are viewed as discursive objects with identifiable properties (Morales, et al., 2014; Peecher and Piercey, 2010; Peecher et al., 2013; Sikka, 2008; 2009; Williams, 2008) . The Court's decision in Hercules, as a sense-making device and vector of dominant discourse, has found its way into audit standards (CICA Handbook Section 5135 and 5136) that reproduce a distorted and narrowly hegemonic view that the auditor's responsibility is to conduct the audit in accordance with Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS) to detect fraud and error. However, this could imply that the auditor is responsible for material misstatements, regardless of source, and, conversely, could also imply that the auditor is not responsible for detecting material misstatement regardless of source (Messier, Glover and Prawitt, 2012, p. 45; see also CICA Handbook Sections 5135 and 5136) Known as the expectation gap, Canadian auditors have, for years, struggled with the dilemma of balancing the responsibility to serve the public and the need to serve their clients who pay their fees (i.e., what they are responsible for) (Smieliauskas and Bewley, 2012, p. 75). If, as the Court ruled, the auditor's job is to prepare financial statements so that current shareholders can assess management's performance, it may be appropriate to ask who do auditors work for: the corporations that employ them or the broader public? Using the recent accounting scandals (not only in Canada, but around the world) as evidence of auditors' allegiance, it becomes evident that they have a common ground with their corporate clients, i.e., to prepare financial statements that will maximize the audited companies' financial performance. Instead of being "watchdogs", the auditors are subordinate to corporate elites who influence their selection, retention and compensation to produce misleading financial reports (Chen et al., 2012; Clinkeman, 2013; Sikka, 2009).
These rationalities are a unique form of discursive complementarities that legitimize the dominant role of auditors through claims about their independence and ethical conduct. Beneath these claims are individuals whose "veneer of respectability is routinely punctured by silence, collusion and revelations of involvement in questionable practices" (Sikka, 2015, p. 9) . Due to the discursive investment of company directors, corporations are able to function as the primary definers of the auditors' role, which enables them to influence the accounting treatment for dubious transactions (Sikka, 2009 ). It then becomes evident that the discursive nuances accompanying the Hercules ruling give rise to practical regularities (of accounting maneuvers) that have become commonplace in preparing audited financial reports (see also Galbraith, 2004) . Audit engagements have now become a meaningless normal functional exercise under conditions of "irrational exuberance" (Shiller, 2001 , p. xii) between talented clients (the corporate directors) and obedient experts (the auditors).
Proposition 3: Effects of Increased Liability on Cost of Capital: Increasing auditor liability for audit failures
The manner in which the Hercules ruling has been conveyed and consumed hinges on the duty of care issue. The ruling in Hercules "reaffirmed that auditors generally do not owe a duty of care to an indeterminate class such as potential investors" (Stock, 2011, p. 4). However, the Court "explicitly stated that there may be an exception depending on the factual situation" of the case (Stock, 2011, p. 4) .
The elements of what constitutes factual situations are open to discretion and interpretation. It is fair to say, however, that Hercules did not nullify auditors' duty of care to shareholders in Canada. Instead, the analysis so far reveals that the Court sets out the conditions in which a duty of care is owned to corporate clients, who are required to present the audited reports to shareholders for performance assessments and not for investment purposes (Anand, 2004, pp.16-17; Anisman, 1997) . Therein lies the danger for auditors in preparing financial reports. On the one hand, the CICA is asserting that auditors have a duty of care to their clients and, at the same time, must work to protect the public interest. The two ultimately cannot be reconciled and, thus, implode, thereby exposing the organized hypocrisy of the CICA.
A special feature so far in this case analysis is the link between auditors' moral responsibility of being mindful of their clients who pay their fees and as useful servants to society (see Carey, 1946) . No doubt there are auditors who want to perform their jobs to the best of their abilities and serve the public interest. These are the auditors that "honour the public trust, and demonstrate commitment to professionalism" by adhering to the professional standards governing their professions (Baker, 2005, p. 693). They are the most fortunate auditors who are hardworking, are driven by core ethical values, are seen as stewards of the auditing professions and ensure that the information from the audits is fairly presented (Gray and Collison, 2002; Lokanan, 2017) . In return for the exclusive franchise to sign off on audit report, these auditors work to protect the public interest from erroneous reporting and are motivated by the pursuit of sustainability in the best way possible (Clinkeman, 2013, p. 11).
Then there are those auditors who operate within the narrow discursive hegemony of the Hercules ruling and use it to legitimize and rationalize their practices. These are auditors who have disavowed themselves of their moral responsibility to serve the public interest (Rosen and Rosen, 2010) . They ebb and flow throughout their professional careers, either because of their lack of understanding of the rules and ethical guidelines that guide the profession, or they understand the rules and ethical guidelines, but choose to follow a discursive practice for personal gain (Lokanan, 2017; Sikka, 2015) . The language used in Hercules has convinced these recalcitrant auditors that they can produce erroneous financial statements with impunity. There is no incentive to curb their predatory practices while attending to the needs of their clients. These auditors are bound to a narrow mode and creatively portray themselves as the "shareholders' auditors", while' at the same time, produce audit reports to maintain their history of silence and collusion with corporate elites (Humphrey et al., 2009; Sikka. 2015) . The latter is indicative of those auditors who want to satisfy their clients so badly that they have to put on their masks and give off the appearance that they are serving the public interest. It is in this respect that the discourse of the Hercules ruling is invoked, framed, gauged and, subsequently, rationalised and legitimized in practice.
At some point in this wider sociocultural practice, auditors who are complicit in compromising auditing standards will have to remove their masks. This will be the point at which they realize that the audited financial reports they are producing are to the detriment of both their clients and third parties. For some of these auditors, it may be that they are unmasked because regulatory agencies detect their misconduct. For others, it may be that they are unmasked because of the pressure from clients to meet the numbers, and, when they failed to do so, they were lost and unable to cope with what is real against what was hidden behind the mask. No one is arguing that auditing is meant to stop companies from using professional judgements in their financial statementsjust to make sure that, when judgements are used, they are properly disclosed (Rapoport, 2010, par. 3 ; also see Chen et al., 2012; Healey and Palepu, 2003) . Under either scenario, the issue which remains "misrecognized" is the possibility that manipulation and deception are normal features of preparing financial reports (Williams, 2008 , p. 480 emphasis added; see also Sikka, 2015) .
Conclusion
The present paper took a critical stance and exposed the connection between the overlapping interests of auditors with corporate elites and the discursive formation of precedents from the Hercules ruling. The institutional and wider social domains in which discursive hegemony occurs reveal that auditors were noncoercive and willing carriers of the discourse in Hercules to sustain a particular practice. The corporate elites have not been rolled back either; instead, they were willing participants in the dissemination of a discourse that advances their agenda of markets and private profits (Sikka, 2015, p. 13) . In an environment of light touch regulation and commercialization of the audit profession, interpreting the ruling in Hercules for personal gain has been the order of the day. By linking the texts and the discourse on auditors' liability, I was able to disentangle and uncover the opaque Contextually, the paper illustrates how the audit profession was able to attach meaning to the controversial Hercules ruling. The "interactive process of meaning-making" exposed the dominant ideology used to chart a course of action that saw auditors being absolved from any duty and standard of care in signing off on financial statements. Minimizing audit risk and the prospect of seemingly unlimited liability has allowed Canadian auditors to background their duties to investors and become advocates for their corporate clients (Rosen and Rosen, 2010) without the fear of being accused of negligent misrepresentation for failing to detect and report on accounting inaccuracies (Parlow, 2012 , p. 1). Misleading financial statements seem to have become acceptable, once they lead to personal enrichment for the audit firms (see also Sikka, 2015) . Contrary to the claim of the audit profession, the normalcy of this discourse, as it is played out in practice, advocates that the auditor's job is to ensure the needs of financial enterprises are met, not to protect ordinary investors who are fleeced out of their life savings and pensions (Levitt, 2002; Parlow, 2012; Sikka, 2015) . By according a privileged place for the information that is disclosed, audited financial statements can be said to offer as much support to investors "as a leaky umbrella from a thunderstorm" (Rosen and Rosen, 2010, p. 15) . 
